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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR MARYLAND
LAWYERS: JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR
VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS
Charles A. Reest
This article examines and compares Maryland and federal
constitutional law regarding access to judicial relief for vio-
lations of individual civil rights. The author collects the
significant constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases
and provides a framework for analyzing possible obstacles
to judicial relief when constitutional issues are presented in
state or federal court
I. INTRODUCTION
An earlier article in this law review1 compared provisions regard-
ing individual rights of a civil nature in the Constitution of Maryland
with related provisions in the Constitution of the United States. The
present article is a comparative study of access to civil judicial reliefP
for violations of those individual rights and the limitations on that
access under the state and federal constitutions, related statutes,
rules, and common law.
Designed for use by lawyers and law students who are familiar
with the principles of federal constitutional law, this guide begins by
stating the justifications for studying the state constitution, particu-
larly in respect to access to both state and federal courts. It then
compares the bases of judicial review under the state and federal
constitutions and explores the extent of judicial review under
Maryland state constitutional law. This article also examines and
compares the state and federal constitutional and policy limitations
on judicial review, including subject matter jurisdictional require-
ments, the necessity of having a cause of action, and governmental
and official immunities.
II. WHY STUDY THE STATE CONSTITUTION
As will be demonstrated, the Constitution of Maryland and the
Constitution of the United States have been construed similarly with
t J.D., 1970, Harvard University; Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law;
Member, Maryland Bar.
1. Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Individual Civil Rights, 7 U.
BALT. L. REV. 299 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Rees].
2. The following matters are beyond the scope of this article: (a) access to relief through ad-
ministrative agency proceedings, criminal prosecutions of violators of rights, and other
means of relief such as publicity or self-help; and (b) timing limitations on access to judicial
relief such as abatement, abstention, and exhaustion. The timing limitations of mootness
and ripeness will, however, be discussed.
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respect to many aspects of access to judicial relief and the limita-
tions thereon for violations of individual rights. Nonetheless, to the
extent that state law is different than federal law or may become dif-
ferent in the future by constitutional amendment, judicial interpreta-
tion, or statutory revision, the study of state constitutional law is of
great utility for several reasons.
First, state law may govern cases adjudicating state constitu-
tional rights in state courts. As was noted in the earlier article in this
law review, the state constitution, rather than the federal, may pro-
vide the basis for claims involving violations of individual rights
because, according to the theory of federalism, state law is the
primary source of protection for individual rights.3 In addition, cer-
tain provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights have never been incorpo-
rated through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and therefore the state constitution affords the only protection
against violation of these rights by state action.4 Moreover, the state
constitution guarantees certain rights that are not contained in the
Federal Constitution.5 Reliance on the state constitution may also be
motivated by the fact that the Supreme Court has taken an increas-
ingly conservative view of the nature and extent of the individual
rights protected by the Federal Constitution.6
When state rights are adjudicated in state courts,7 state law
regarding access to judicial relief ordinarily applies. There are some
situations, however, in which federal law may apply. For example,
when the application of state law regarding access violates federal
constitutional rights such as due process8 or equal protection, federal
law governs access to judicial relief. Federal law also applies when
the application of state law impinges on the immunity of the federal
government or of federal officials and is, therefore, preempted by fed-
eral constitutional, statutory, or common law provision.9 In addition,
when the Supreme Court reviews the federal questions involved in
either of the two situations above, the federal law of access to
judicial relief controls.10
Second, state law regarding access to judicial relief may govern
in cases in which federal constitutional rights are adjudicated in
state courts. In most cases, state and federal courts have concurrent
3. Rees, supra note 1, at 299-300.
4. 1d. at 300.
5. Id. at 301.
6. Id.
7. When a federal official is sued, the case may be removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442 or § 1442a (1976).
8. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980) (dictum) (state immunity may be arbi-
trary or irrational).
9. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (dictum) (federal official may be immune
under federal law); notes 180, 197, 200 & 217 infra.
10. Review may be sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). Only review of the federal questions
is permitted. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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jurisdiction to hear federal claims." To the extent that federal courts
are viewed as more hostile than state courts, either because of
stricter limitations on access to judicial relief 12 or because of unfavor-
able decisions on the merits, 3 state courts may increasingly be used
to litigate federal rights.'
4
When federal rights are adjudicated in state courts,'5 both state
and federal law regarding access to judicial relief may apply. State
law dealing with subject matter jurisdictional requirements ordi-
narily controls. 16 By definition, whether a cause of action exists is de-
11. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). But cf, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976) (federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction in patent, plant variety protection, and copyright
cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976) (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in suits against
the United States).
12. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518, 519 (1975) (Douglas & Brennan, J.J., dis-
senting).
13. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 495-98 (1977). Of course, state courts are bound by Supreme Court precedents inter-
preting federal constitutional rights. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). But cf
Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 690-91, 344 A.2d 80, 81 (1975) (Maryland courts are not
bound by lower federal court precedents interpreting federal constitutional rights).
14. Of course, there may be other reasons, procedural or practical, for a litigant to select state
courts. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 31 (3d ed. 1976); Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 91 HARV. L. REv. 317, 327-30 (1977).
15. Many of these cases may be removed to federal court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442
(1976).
16. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 n.8
(1977) (dictum). See also 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4024 (1977). When state procedures are more restrictive of
federal substantive rights than are federal procedures, however, federal procedures may
be required even in state court. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S.
359 (1952) (jury trial right in Federal Employers Liability Act case in state court). When
the case involves a federal claim, the federal constitutional power to control procedures in
state courts has been questioned. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO& H. WECHSLER,
HART& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 571 (2d ed. 1973). It
has been suggested that a determination of whether state or federal procedures are to
apply depends upon a balancing of the state interest in the orderly, efficient, and consis-
tent administration of justice with the federal interest in preventing destruction of federal
rights in the name of local procedure. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E.
GRESSMAN, supra, at § 4021. Cf Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (balancing of
state and federal interests in diversity cases in federal courts).
The language of Supreme Court precedents regarding whether state or federal limita-
tions on access to judicial relief apply leaves a confused picture. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, supra, at § 4023. Moreover, those precedents were decided
before Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), which held that, at least for purposes of
Supreme Court review, state procedures restricting federal substantive rights were ade-
quate only when those procedures clearly served legitimate state interests that could not
be substantially served by other alternatives less restrictive of the federal rights. Of
course, Henry may also be described as a way of balancing state and federal interests.
It is questionable whether state law, if more restrictive than federal law, might be
considered as "adequate and independent grounds" barring Supreme Court review of the
claim of federal right. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (describing the adequate
and independent state ground doctrine). See also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 )1965)
(distinguishing between substantive and procedural state grounds). So far, the Supreme
Court has not considered more restrictive state limitations as '.'adequate and independent
grounds" for upholding a state court judgment in a case in which federal rights are
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termined under federal law. The immunity of the federal and state
governments and of federal and state officials generally is governed
by federal law. 7 Federal subject matter jurisdictional requirements
apply when Supreme Court review of a state court judgment is
sought18 and granted. 9
Third, state law regarding access may control in cases in which
state constitutional rights are adjudicated in federal courts. These
cases include diversity cases, federal question cases in which ques-
tions of state rights are raised as pendent or ancillary claims, cases
removed from state to federal court,2" and cases in which the
Supreme Court reviews state court judgments.21
When state rights are adjudicated in federal courts, the law re-
garding access to judicial relief is mixed. Federal law concerning sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and the immunities of the federal and state
governments ordinarily applies. 2 Whether a cause of action exists,
by definition, is governed by state law. 23 With respect to the immuni-
claimed. See Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964) (dismissed for mootness); Allied
Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (dismissed for lack of standing); Staub v.
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (same); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (dismissed for
want of adverse parties); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908) (sovereign
immunity).
17. As to the immunity of the federal government and federal officials, see notes 180, 197, 200
& 217 infra As to the immunity of state governments, see General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209
U.S. 211 (1908), and state officials, see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980).
State law regarding the immunities of the state government or of state governmental
officials may be relevant when those immunities are less protective than federal im-
munities and when the federal immunities are not of constitutional stature. Cf Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1972) (dictum) (in a federal question case in
federal court stricter state law may inform federal common law with respect to pollution
of interstate waters).
18. Review may be sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). Although the Supreme Court may
only review federal questions, Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875),
whether state procedures prevent vindication of federal substantive rights is a federal
question. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
19. Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302 (1976) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (mootness);
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (same); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974) (same); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964) (same); Cramp v. Board of Pub. In-
struction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (standing); Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959)
(same); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (same); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
429 (1952) (same).
20. See notes 7 & 15 supra.
21. See notes 10 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
22. Cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (federal rules of procedure, when applicable,
govern). It is open to debate whether under the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), state limitations, if more restrictive than the federal, might govern, inasmuch as
they might otherwise affect the outcome, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945),
or influence the choice of a forum, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
23. Under the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), there may be a distinction be-
tween substantive and remedial aspects of the cause of action. Whether a state constitu-
tion confers a right would be a substantive matter, governed by state law; whether an
equitable remedy exists for the violation of such a right would be a procedural matter,
governed by federal law, even if the remedy was not available in state courts. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1945). Whether the availability of other, non-
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ties of governmental officials, federal law applies as to federal offi-
cials,24 and state law applies as to state officials.25
Fourth, although federal law regarding access to judicial relief
ordinarily applies when federal rights are adjudicated in federal
courts, state law may govern in cases removed from state to federal
court,26 in cases in which the Supreme Court reviews state court
judgments,27 and even in cases originally brought in federal court.
For example, state law may apply when it is incorporated by federal
law 28 or when there is no relevant federal law.29 In addition, state law
may control when the immunities of the state government or of state
government officials under state law are less protective than those
immunities under federal law, and when the federal immunities are
not of constitutional stature. 0
Therefore, both federal and state constitutional law should be
examined, not only as it relates to the substantive aspects of a case
involving individual rights, but also as it relates to the law of access
to judicial relief. A consideration of the rules of access in federal and
state courts should aid the determination of whether a state or
federal forum is to be used to litigate a particular constitutional
claim. The rules relating to access will be considered below after
examining the power of judicial review, its sources, and its various
aspects.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The power of judicial review, that is, the power of courts to
declare governmental acts unconstitutional, is well established in
Maryland. 31 The first statement of that power by the Court of Ap-
equitable relief, such as damages, would be a substantive or a procedural matter is
unclear. Federal law regarding related claims and defenses may apply. See notes 8 & 9 and
accompanying text supra.
24. See notes 196, 199 & 216 infra.
25. See 4 C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1110 (1969 & Supp.
1979) (citing lower federal court cases).
26. See note 15 supra.
27. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
28. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) (Federal Tort Claims Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (general
federal civil rights remedies); FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (capacity to sue or be sued).
29. E.g., DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (Court looked to state law for definition of
"children" in claim under federal copyright law). See also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general common law").
30. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1972) (dictum) (federal court may
apply stricter state standard for protection of interstate waters).
31. Everstine, The Legislative Process in Maryland, 10 MD. L. REV. 91, 154 (1949).
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peals of Maryland in Whittington v. Polk3 2 preceded the Supreme
Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison.33
Despite its long-standing acceptance in Maryland, in other
states, and in the federal system, the doctrine of judicial review is of
continuing interest for a number of reasons. First, if judicial review
is not constitutionally proper, it cannot be legitimized by the mere
passage of time and should be either expressly adopted by consti-
tutional amendment or overruled by the courts or by constitutional
amendment."4 Second, to the extent that there is doubt about the
legitimacy of judicial review, the courts may tend to limit the cases
they will consider by their definitions of the case or controversy doc-
trine and by rules of judicial self-restraint. 5 Third, to the extent that
there is that doubt, the courts may exercise greater deference to the
judgment of other branches of government - federal and state -
such as by a presumption of constitutionality and by review against
a rational basis standard rather than one of strict scrutiny.3 6 Fourth,
so long as the power of the courts to review governmental acts, par-
ticularly those of the legislative branches, remains open to question,
legislators may limit the statutory jurisdiction of the courts.37
Although the theoretical bases for an implied power of judicial
review in the constitutions of Maryland and the United States are
similar in some respects, they differ in others. The similarities in-
clude the reliance in both Whittington and Marbury on the nature of
a written constitution as paramount law, the nature and duty of the
judiciary to say what the law is, and particular constitutional pro-
visions as reflecting the intent of the framers to establish the power
of judicial review.38 With respect to the differences between the con-
stitutions of Maryland and the United States, some of the disparities
suggest a firmer basis for judicial review in the state constitution
and others suggest a firmer basis in the Federal Constitution.
32. 1 H. & J. 236 (Md. 1802) (dictum). The first holding was in State v. Dashiell, 6 H. & J. 268
(Md. 1824). Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976), a recent restatement of
the power of judicial review, considered the retroactivity of a determination of unconsti-
tutionality.
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 208-09 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BERGER].
35. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
677-84 (1973).
36. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (9th ed. 1975).
37. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (1978).
38. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803); Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J.
236, 242-46 (Md. 1802). Note that both constitutions also establish an independent
judiciary, arguably presupposing judicial review and minimizing retaliation thereto by the
coordinate branches. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (term during good behavior and no diminu-
tion of salary); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XL and MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art.
XXX (term during good behavior and secure salaries). Cf MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 14, 24,
41H and MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 33 (15 year term unless discharge for inability
and no diminution of salary). See generally BERGER, supra note 34, at 117.
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The Constitution of Maryland affords a sounder basis for
judicial review than the Constitution of the United States in the
following respects. First, the state constitution, unlike its federal
counterpart, originally provided that the constitution could not be
altered, changed, or abolished by the legislature 39  except as
specifically prescribed.40 Second, an express separation of powers
provision is included in the state constitution,' while that doctrine is
only impliedly included in the Federal Constitution.42 Third, Mary-
land's constitution makes state legislative and executive officials ac-
countable for their conduct as trustees of the public.4 3 Fourth, judges
in Maryland are required by the state constitution to have legal
training,44 presumably making them better qualified than others to
decide legal and constitutional questions.45 Fifth, the state consti-
tution includes an express provision making the judgment of the
highest court final and conclusive against the legislature and ex-
ecutive,46 while finality is only implied in the Federal Constitution.47
Sixth, the state constitution includes a receiving clause, which
declares what existing law is to continue in force, directs the
39. MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XLII. The constitution, however, specified no
remedy for unconstitutional acts of the legislature. But cf MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS
art. 9 (originally adopted as MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. VII) (only the legis-
lature ought to suspend the laws). See generally Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to
1801, in 1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 102 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Goebel]. For a discussion of MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 9, in which the author classifies article 9 as a declaration of abstract
principles, see A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (1915) [hereinafter cited as
NILES].
40. See note 56 infra.
41. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8 (originally adopted as MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. VI). According to the separation of powers doctrine, the power of judging the
law, including determining the validity of the acts of the legislature, must remain separate
from the power of making the law. Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 242-43, 247 (Md.
1802). Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-79 (1803). Of course, the power
of judicial review, inasmuch as it may involve an interference by the courts in the law-
making function, can also be seen as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. See
Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471, 71 A.2d 474, 478 (1950).
42. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977); THE FEDERALIST
No. 23 (J. Madison).
43. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 6 (originally adopted as MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. IV). Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 1 and § 5, cl 2 and amend. XVII (ac-
countability of legislators through election and expulsion); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 1, 2,
4 and amend. XII (accountability of President through election and impeachment). It is
only by implication that the constitution has placed the judiciary as a safeguard against
infringement of the constitution. See Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 245 (Md. 1802).
44. Compare MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (judges admitted to practice law in the state and having
sound legal knowledge) with MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. LVI (judges
having sound judgment in the law). Cf North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) (federal con-
stitution not violated by trial before judge not trained in the law when appeal with a trial
de novo before lawyer-judge available).
45. Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 245 (Md. 1802).
46. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 15 (originally adopted as MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LVI). See gen-
eraly BERGER, supra note 34, at 188-97.
47. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792).
19801 Judicial Relief
judiciary as to what law to apply, and affirms the authority of the
legislature to make future changes.48
On the other hand, the Constitution of the United States in cer-
tain respects provides a more substantial basis for judicial review
than the Constitution of Maryland. First, the Federal Constitution,
unlike the state constitution, defines and limits the powers of the
legislature. 49 Second, the Federal Constitution can be amended only
by the people,50 while the state constitution originally provided for
amendment by the legislature only.5' Third, unlike the original state
constitution, the Federal Constitution conferred, in broad terms,
"judicial power" on the courts.2 Fourth, power to hear cases "arising
under this Constitution" is expressly granted to the courts in the
Federal Constitution.5 3 Fifth, the Federal Constitution expressly
makes effective not every law, but only laws made "in pursuance" of
the Constitution." Sixth, under the Federal Constitution, judges are
required to take an oath to support the Constitution, which was not
the case in the original state constitution.55 Seventh, the Framers of
the Federal Constitution in 1787, unlike the framers of the original
state constitution in 1776, were influenced by post-revolutionary
48. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5 (originally adopted as MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 1i1); accord, State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 358-59 (Md. 1821). See gen-
erally Goebel, supra note 39, at 109-18.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,176 (1803)
(powers of legislature are defined and limited) with Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 246
(Md. 1802) (powers of legislature are not particularly or specifically defined, but conferred
under a general grant). Of course, both constitutions contain express limitations on the
power of the legislature, see, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9; MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 36, 40, 55,
recognize the constraints arising from our system of federalism, U.S. CONST. amend. X;
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 2, and provide for rights of individuals against govern-
mental actions, Rees, supra note 1, passim.
50. U.S. CONST. art. V (proposed amendments ratified by the people through state legisla-
tures or state conventions).
51. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LIX (proposed amendments ratified by legislature after public
notice and new elections). Cf MD. CONST. art. XIV (proposed amendments ratified by
voters).
52. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. Although the Constitution of Maryland of 1776 was silent as to
judicial power, the current constitution vests it in the courts. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The
judicial power contemplated was that exercised by the English courts at common law,
including, by hypothesis, judicial review. E.g., Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652
(1610). See generally BERGER, supra note 34, at 209-12.
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Some commentators have viewed the grant as conferring
the power of judicial review. E.g., BERGER, supra note 34, at 198-222.
54. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch} 137, 180 (1803).
55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). The
original state constitution did not include a requirement that judges take an oath to sup-
port the constitution. Cf MD. CONST. of 1776, art. L (oath to appoint clerks impartially);
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LII (oath not to profiteer); MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS
art. XXV (oath of support and fidelity to the state and declaration of a belief in the Chris-
tian religion). See also Law of April 20, 1777, ch. 5, 1777 MD. LAWS (oath to do equal right
and justice according to law). The current state constitution includes a requirement that
judges take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the constitution
and laws of Maryland. MD. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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abuses of state legislative power, by state courts exercising judicial
review, and by legislative actions taken in retaliation to judicial
review.56
Whatever the bases, state court judicial review under the consti-
tutions of both Maryland and the United States has three different
aspects. The first concerns the role of state courts as concurrent
forums for the determination of federal constitutional questions. The
Constitution of the United States authorizes state courts to pass on
the validity of federal laws and treaties under the Federal Consti-
tution. 7
A second facet of judicial review in state courts relates to the
concept of supremacy. The supremacy clauses of both the federal
and state59 constitutions give state courts the authority to rule on
the validity of state constitutions and laws under the Constitution of
the United States. Of course, the supremacy clauses of both con-
stitutions make supreme not only the Federal Constitution ° and
Supreme Court interpretations of that Constitution,6' but also
56. BERGER, supra note 34, at 34-46. As suggested in the text, the second, third, sixth, and
seventh differences between the two constitutions no longer exist. The Constitution of
Maryland now provides, respectively, that the constitution can be amended only by the
people, art. XIV, that the "judicial power" is conferred in broad terms on the courts, art.
IV, § 1, and that judges take an oath to support the constitution, art. I, § 9. Of course, the
history of post-revolutionary judicial review and legislative retaliatory actions was
available to the framers of the current state constitution.
57. Under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, state judges are bound by the
Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties. According to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), the supremacy clause requires courts to give the Constitution
primacy over other laws. See also BERGER, supra note 34, at 266-79. Berger concludes
that the Framers of the Constitution intended state courts to have the power to review
the constitutionality of acts of Congress and of treaties and that the first Congress
assumed state courts had that power when it left the great bulk of federal question
jurisdiction to state courts and provided for review of such cases (including judgments of
state courts that a federal statute or treaty was invalid) by appeal to the Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court has affirmed state court determinations that federal
laws were unconstitutional, see, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), a Supreme Court
decision holding that state courts have the power to declare federal laws unconstitutional
has not been found. No Court of Appeals of Maryland decision, holding that a federal law
was unconstitutional, has been found. The court of appeals, however, after assuming it
had the power to review the constitutionality of federal law, has upheld challenged federal
law. See, e.g., State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972).
58. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
59. MD. CONST, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 2.
60. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (supremacy over state statute); David-
son v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975) (supremacy over state constitution).
61. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Merrick v. State, 283 Md. 1, 389 A.2d 328 (1978).
But cf id at 7, 389 A.2d at 331 (opinion of a plurality of Supreme Court Justices not con-
trolling); Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 690-91, 344 A.2d 80, 81 (1975) (lower federal
court interpretations of federal law not controlling). But see Gayety Books, Inc. v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 279 Md. 206, 369 A.2d 581 (1977) (lower federal court opinions may be con-
sidered as persuasive authority).
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federal statutes62 and treaties. 63 Both constitutions require that state
courts give federal law precedence when there is a conflict with state
constitutions,64 laws,65 acts of the executive, 66 or acts of county,
municipal, and other local units of government under powers dele-
gated by the state.
67
The final aspect of judicial review in state courts is the power of
state courts to interpret the Constitution of Maryland. The state
constitution authorizes the state judiciary to decide on the validity
of state governmental acts in light of the mandates of the Constitu-
tion of Maryland. Governmental acts subject to review include acts
of the legislature,61 acts of the executive,69 acts of the judiciary (com-
mon law)70 and acts of county, municipal, and other local units of
government under powers delegated by the legislature.
7
1
In theory, the power of judicial review is broad. In practice, how-
ever, it is limited by a number of factors, including the requirements
of subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of action and the existence
of governmental and official immunities.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The constitutional aspects of the subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts and of Maryland state courts may be compared
using four factors: (1) whether jurisdiction may be exercised only by
courts named in the constitution; (2) whether the constitution
specifies only certain categories of cases within the courts' jurisdic-
62. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (supremacy over state statute). See Home
Utils. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610, 122 A.2d 109 (1956) (supremacy
over state statute).
63. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (supremacy of treaty over state
statute); see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (supremacy of executive agree-
ment over state policy); Chryssikos v. Demarco, 134 Md. 533, 107 A. 358 (1919)
(supremacy of treaty over state constitution and statute).
64. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (supremacy of Federal Constitution); Davidson v.
Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975) (same).
65. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (supremacy of Federal Constitution); see
Home Utils. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610, 122 A.2d 109 (1956)
(supremacy of federal statute).
66. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (supremacy of Federal Consti-
tution and statute); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962)
(supremacy of Federal Constitution).
67. See Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829) (supremacy of Federal Constitution
over city ordinance); In re Leroy T., 285 Md. 508, 403 A.2d 1226 (1979) (same).
68. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Bucholtz v. Hill, 178 Md. 280, 13 A.2d 348 (1940).See also Department of Natural
Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975).
70. See Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979) (common law crime of misprision of
a felony abolished); MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
71. County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973). See
generally Comment, State and Local Legislative Powers, 8 U. BALT. L. REv. 300 (1979).
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tion; (3) whether the jurisdiction of the courts must be expressly pro-
vided by statute; and (4) whether the jurisdiction of the courts is
limited by justiciability doctrines.
7 2
1. Courts Named in the Constitution. The federal judicial
power, with one exception, need not be exercised by courts named in
the Constitution of the United States.7" In contrast, the state judicial
power, with one exception, may be exercised only by courts named in
the Constitution of Maryland.1
4
2. Constitutional Categories of Cases. Federal courts are
limited to hearing cases within categories described in the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 5 On the other hand, the state courts' juris-
diction is not limited by any reference to categories of cases de-
scribed in the Constitution of Maryland. 6
3. Jurisdiction Expressly Provided by Statute. Except for the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,77 the jurisdiction of the
federal courts must be described by statute s. 7  The jurisdictions of
72. Other factors, such as original versus appellate jurisdiction and exclusive versus concur-
rent jurisdiction, are largely irrelevant to this study.
73. The federal judicial power is vested in "inferior courts" to be established by Congress and
in "one supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
The principal inferior courts established by Congress are the courts of appeal, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 41, 43 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and the district courts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-132 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). Congress has created other inferior courts that exercise the federal
judicial power under article III. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1976) (Court of Claims); id § 211
(Court of Customs and Patent Appeals); id § 251 (Customs Court). Congress, acting under
powers granted by other articles of the Constitution, has created other inferior courts.
See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (local courts for the District of
Columbia pursuant to art. I, § 8, cl. 17). Only the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and dis-
trict courts are considered in this study.
74. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 44, 343 A.2d 521, 526 (1975)
(noting the contrast between federal and state requirements). The state judicial power is
vested in courts specifically named in MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 27 - a court of appeals,
circuit courts, orphans' courts, courts for Baltimore City (the Supreme Bench, the
Superior Court, the Court of Common Pleas, the Baltimore City Court, the Circuit Court,
and the Criminal Court), and a district court - and in the intermediate courts of appeal,
described in MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 14A, pursuant to which the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland was established by MD. CTIS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-401 (1980).
All the state courts except for the orphans' courts are considered in this study.
75. See Hedgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). The most important categories
described in the Constitution are cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States, cases to which the United States is a party, and cases between citizens
of different stvtes. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
76. See MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 14A, 27, 41A.
77. E.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59 (1979). Nevertheless, the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is described in 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. III 1979). Cf Ex parte McCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (affirmative description by Congress of Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction implies negation of other appellate jurisdiction, because Congress
has authority to make exceptions to Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2). The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is de-
scribed in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1258 (1976).
78. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (Congress, having power to establish
inferior courts, must define their jurisdiction). The jurisdictions of the courts of appeal
and the district courts are described, respectively, in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1294 and §§
1330-1363 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
The requirement is of constitutional significance. Exercise by the federal courts of
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the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland79 and the district court,"°
unlike the jurisdictions of the state circuit courts' and the courts for
Baltimore City,82 must be described by statute. Whether the jurisdic-
jurisdiction not described by statute would interfere with constitutional grants of power
to Congress to establish inferior federal courts and to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, s'e American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,
17-18 (1951), and would possibly interfere with a constitutional reservation of power in
the states and their courts, see Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
79. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14A provides: "The General Assembly may be [sic] law create such
intermediate courts of appeal, as may be necessary. The General Assembly may prescribe
the intermediate appellate jurisdiction of these courts of appeal, and all other powers
necessary for the operation of such courts." Thus, the jurisdiction of the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, established by MD. CT. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-401 (1980),
must be described by statute. State v. Denisio, 21 Md. App. 159, 162, 318 A.2d 559, 561
(1974). The legislature has described that jurisdiction in MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 12-308 (1980).
80. MD. CONsr. art. IV, § 41A provides in part: "The District Court shall have the original
jurisdiction prescribed by law." The legislature has described that jurisdiction in MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -402 (1980).
81. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 20 provides in part:
A Court shall be held in each County of the State to be styled the Circuit Court
for the County, in which it may be held. The said Circuit Courts shall have and
exercise, in the respective counties, all the power, authority and jurisdiction,
original and appellate, which the present Circuit Courts of this State now have
and exercise, or which may hereafter be prescribed by law.
Historically, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts has been broad. Earlier constitutions
incorporated the jurisdiction of the then-existing county courts. See MD. CONsr. of 1864,
art. IV, § 25; MD. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 8; MD. CONST. of 1776, § 1 of 1805 amendment.
That jurisdiction was initially described by indirection much the same as that of English
common law courts. See MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. III (similar to the pre-
sent DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5). See also Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 530, 122 A.2d 102, 105
(1956).
That the jurisdiction of the circuit courts is granted by MD. CONST. art. IV, § 20 and
need not be described by statute is suggested in MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501
(1980), which provides:
The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exer-
cising original jurisdiction within the State. Each has full common-law and
equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county,
and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and
by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclu-
sively upon another tribunal.
See also First Federated Commodity Trust Corp. v. Commissioner of Sec., 272 Md. 329,
335, 322 A.2d 539, 543 (1974); Moore v. Moore, 218 Md. 218, 220 n.1, 145 A.2d 764, 765
n.1 (1958); Adkins, Code Revision in Maryland, 34 MD. L. REv. 7, 16 (1974) (provisions in
the Maryland Code regarding organization of the circuit courts are informationally un-
necessary because they are contained in the state constitution and were included in the
code merely for symmetry). But cf Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1868) (power
of Congress to make exceptions to appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court implies a
requirement of affirmative statutory description of such jurisdiction).
Exclusive statutory grants of original jurisdiction to other tribunals, which limit the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts, include MD. CIS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-301, 4-401
(1980) (Maryland district courts); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1338(a), 1351, 1356 (1976) (United
States District Courts); and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. III 1979) (Supreme Court).
82. MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 28-30 describe the jurisdictions of the courts for Baltimore City in
terms of the jurisdictions exercised by the then-existing courts of Baltimore City. Earlier
constitutions described the jurisdictions of those existing courts. See MD. CONST. of 1864,
art. IV, §§ 33-36; MD. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, §§ 10, 11, 13. The legislature has recog-
nized that the jurisdictions of the courts for Baltimore City are as broad as the jurisdic-
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tion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland must be described by
statute is open to debate.83
4. Justiciability Limitations. Both federal and state courts are
limited by doctrines of justiciability which are, at least arguably, of
constitutional origin.8 4 Comprised of similar elements, both the fed-
eral and the state doctrines prohibit advisory opinions, moot cases,
and political questions. In addition, both require adverse parties,
parties with standing, and ripe issues.
(a) Sources. Although the constitutional sources of the federal
and state justiciability doctrines are similar, the extents to which the
tion of the circuit courts. See MD. CIS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 1-101(b), 1-501 (1980).
See also Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689,696,344 A.2d 80, 84 (1975). MD. CONST. art. IV, §§
28-30 have been repealed, effective January 1, 1983. See Law of May 20, 1980, ch. 523,
1980 MD. LAWS 1869.
83. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14 provides in part: "The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals shall
be co-extensive with the limits of the State and such as now is or may hereafter be
prescribed by law." The Court of Appeals of Maryland has frequently construed this pro-
vision to mean that its jurisdiction must be described by legislation. E.g., Smith v. Taylor,
285 Md. 143, 146, 400 A.2d 1130, 1132-33 (1979) (final judgment rule); Lohss v. State,
272 Md. 113, 116, 321 A.2d 534, 537 (1974) (no right of state to appeal in criminal case);
Wylie v. Johnston, 29 Md. 298, 303-04 (1868) (final judgment rule) (separation of powers
limitation on the court). The court of appeals has recognized an exception, however, when
the ground for appeal was that a lower court exceeded its jurisdiction. Lambros v. Brown,
184 Md. 350, 353, 41 A.2d 78, 79 (1945). The court of appeals has also promulgated rules
giving itself jurisdiction to hear attorney disciplinary proceedings. MD. R.P. BV 1- 18. Cf
MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 17 (repealed 1977) (statutory description of the court's appellate
jurisdiction in attorney disciplinary proceedings).
The legislature has described the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. See MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-307 (1980). As a matter of constitutional interpretations,
however, MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14, arguably, does not require the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals of Maryland to be described by statute. First, the provision can be compared
with earlier constitutional provisions describing the jurisdiction of the court of appeals.
MD. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 19; MD. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 2; MD. CONST. of 1776, § 5
of 1805 amendment. Like earlier provisions, MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14 can be construed as
incorporating the jurisdiction of the then-existing court of appeals, which jurisdiction
initially was in all cases of appeal from specified courts. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LVI. See
C. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 80, 96-97, 151 (1928). Second, the provi-
sion can be compared with other provisions describing the jurisdiction of other courts.
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14 is dissimilar to art. IV, §§ 14A, 41A, see notes 79 & 80 supra,
which more clearly give the legislature power to describe the jurisdictions of the court of
special appeals and the district court, respectively. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14 is also
dissimilar to art. IV, § 40, which gives the orphans' courts "all the powers now vested in
the Orphans' Courts of the State, subject to such changes as the Legislature may
prescribe." MD. CONST. art. IV, § 40 has been construed as authorizing the legislature to
add or subtract from the existing powers of the orphans' courts. Savings Bank v. Weeks,
110 Md. 78, 92 (1909). However, MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14 is similar to art. IV, § 20, see
note 81 supra, which, it is assumed, gives the circuit courts jurisdiction absent any
statutory grant. See also Adkins, Code Revision in Maryland, 34 MD. L. REV. 7, 16 (1974)
(provisions in the Maryland Code regarding structure and organization of the court of
appeals are informationally unnecessary, because they are contained in the constitution,
and are included in the code merely for symmetry).
Of course, the statutory grant of exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the court of spe-
cial appeals limits the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 12-308 (1980).
84. There are also certain self-imposed rules of policy or restraint, not even arguably of consti-
tutional origin, by which federal and state courts have considered themselves bound. See
Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947); Hammond v. Lancaster, 194
Md. 462, 472-73, 71 A.2d 474, 478 (1950).
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doctrines are constitutionally-based, rather than policy-based, are
different.
Regarding constitutional sources, the federal doctrine is based
on the terms "cases" and "controversies" in article III, section 2,
clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States, which reflects both
separation of powers and historical limitations on judicial power. 5
The state doctrine is based on the separation of powers principle in
article 8 of the Declaration of Rights and the related idea of "judicial
power" mentioned in article IV, section 1 of the Constitution of
Maryland.,"
Regarding the extents to which the justiciability doctrines are
based on the respective constitutions, rather than on policy, the
federal doctrine is a blend of constitutional requirements and policy
considerations which are ordinarily not easily distinguishable.7 In
contrast, the state doctrine has elements clearly attributable either
to the Constitution of Maryland or to policy. The limitations that are
of constitutional origin are the prohibitions against advisory opin-
ions regarding legal questions pending before coordinate branches of
government 8 and political questions. 9 The policy constraints in-
clude bans against advisory opinions rendered in judicial pro-
85. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). Apparently, the term "judicial power- in U.S.
CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2 has not been a source of the justiciability doctrine.
86. Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 295, 380 A.2d 12, 21 (1977). The Constitu-
tion of Maryland contains no express language limiting judicial power to "cases" or "con-
troversies." Id at 290, 380 A.2d at 18.
Although Reyes appeared to limit the discussion of the justiciability doctrine to suits
for declaratory judgments, see id at 287-89, 380 A.2d at 17-18, the doctrine seems to
apply to other types of cases. Supreme Court cases, cited by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland as persuasive authority, see id at 283, 285, 286, 289, 380 A.2d at 14, 15-16, 18,
have applied the justiciability doctrine to other kinds of cases. The court of appeals previ-
ously applied the doctrine in cases in which injunctive relief, as well as declaratory relief,
was demanded. E.g., Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471-72, 71 A.2d 474, 477
(1950). In addition, the court has applied the doctrine in cases in which declaratory relief
was not sought, e.g., Sansbury v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 237 Md. 545, 548, 206 A.2d
807, 808 (1965) (post-conviction relief), and has opined in dicta that the doctrine applies
generally, e.g., Liberto v. State's Attorney, 223 Md. 356, 361,164 A.2d 719, 722 (1960). Of
course, Reyes may simply reflect the observation that suits for declaratory relief often
raise the most doubts about justiciability, see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227 (1937), and the fact that the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act expressly
requires satisfaction of certain elements of justiciability, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-409(a) (1980).
87. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). Compare Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406
U.S. 583, 588 (1972) (ripeness may be distinguished from the limitations imposed by arti-
cle III) with Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297-305 (1979) (abstract
questions are not justiciable under article II). Cf Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 100-01
(suggestion that separation of powers doctrine imposes an absolute barrier, while
historical limitations require a flexible or case-by-case approach). But see United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (general rule that a party may not assert the rights of third
persons is based on policy, not the Constitution).
88. Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 293-94, 380 A.2d 12, 20-21 (1977)
(dictum).
89. See id at 295, 380 A.2d at 21 (separation of powers principle in MD. CONST., DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 8 prohibits the courts from performing nonjudicial functions).
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ceedings9° and moot questions,9 and requirements of adverse par-
ties,92 standing,9 3 and ripeness.94
Whether the federal and state justiciability doctrines are based
on the respective constitutions, rather than on policy, has a number
of procedural and substantive implications. Procedurally, when a
party fails to satisfy the justiciability doctrines, dismissal of the case
is mandatory if the doctrines are constitutionally-based and discre-
tionary if policy-based.95 To the extent that constitutionally-based
elements of justiciability touch on a court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion, while policy-based elements do not, the distinction has signifi-
cance96 for the rules regarding waiver of the preliminary defense of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction,9 7 consideration of pendent and
ancillary claims,"" appellate review of subject matter jurisdiction, al-
though the issue was not raised at trial,99 and collateral attack
because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 100 Substantively,
whether the federal and state justiciability doctrines are based upon
the respective constitutions, rather than on policy, determines
whether the doctrines may be substantially modified only by amend-
ment of the constitution'"' or whether they may be modified by the
courts'02 or by the legislature. 0 3
90. Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 293-94, 380 A.2d 12, 20 (1977).
91. Id at 292, 293, 380 A.2d at 20 (dictum).
92. Id at 298-99, 380 A.2d at 23.
93. See id at 296 n.14, 380 A.2d at 22 n.14.
94. Id at 292, 380 A.2d at 20 (dictum that the rule against decision of abstract issues is based
on policy, not constitutional limitations).
95. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962); Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md.
279, 287, 289, 296-97,301,380 A.2d 12, 17, 18, 23-24 (1977). But cf United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-29 (1966) (pendent subject matter jurisdiction includes ele-
ments of both power and discretion).
96. This distinction is suggested by the cases, but the consequences have not been clearly
articulated. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962); see Reyes v. Prince George's County,
281 Md. 279, 292, 294-95, 380 A.2d 12, 19, 20 (1977).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g), (h); MD. R.P. 323(b).
98. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). Cf MD. R.P. BF40-43 (ancillary injunctive
relief in action at law).
99. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Eastgate Assocs. v. Apper,.
276 Md. 698, 700, 350 A.2d 661, 663 (1976).
100. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). But cf Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963)
(general rule of finality of jurisdictional determinations); Messall v. Merlands Club, Inc.,
244 Md. 18, 222 A.2d 627 (1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967) (same).
101. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,92-93 (1968); Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md.
279, 287-99, 380 A.2d 12, 17-24 (1977). But cf United States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 n.ll (1980) (article III mootness doctrine is flexible); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. at 97 (constitutional requirements and policy considerations are not
easily distinguishable).
102. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1968); Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md.
279, 287-99, 380 A.2d 12, 17-24 (1977).
103. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). But cf Reyes v. Prince
George's County, 281 Md. 279, 298 n.16, 380 A.2d 12, 23 n.16 (1977) (because of separa-
tion of powers doctrine, legislature may not require courts to decide moot or abstract
questions). The Reyes limitation on legislative power may be criticized on two grounds.
First, Reyes also held that a court's decision in regard to a moot or an abstract question
would not raise a separation of powers problem and, therefore, was a matter of policy, not
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(b) Elements. The federal and state justiciability doctrines
contain similar elements with similar contents. The elements of both
justiciability doctrines include advisory opinions, adverse parties,
standing, mootness, ripeness, and political questions. Each will be
discussed below with an emphasis upon the differences that exist
between the state and federal doctrines.
(i) Advisory Opinions. Generally, advisory opinions are pro-
hibited by both federal'0 4 and state' 5 law. Although the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has noted the similarity between federal and state
law on the subject, 10 6 the court has drawn a distinction between two
types of advisory opinions. The first type embraces cases that in-
volve legal questions pending before a coordinate branch.07 The sec-
ond type relates to questions in judicial proceedings in which there is
no actual controversy between the parties.' 8 According to the
court of appeals, state courts may render advisory opinions in a nar-
row class of cases of the second type when compelling circumstances
are present.'09
(ii) Adverse Parties. Both federal" 0 and state"' law generally
require adverse parties, not feigned, fictitious, friendly, or collusive
suits." Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has noted the
similarity between federal and state law on the subject,' 13
Maryland's position appears less rigid in that state courts may adju-
dicate a suit, absent adverse parties, in a narrow class of cases char-
acterized by certain compelling circumstances."
4
of constitutional significance. Id at 292. The anticipated response to this first criticism,
that the policy issue is one to be decided by the courts, not the legislature, leads to the sec-
ond criticism. MD. CONST. art. III, § 56, giving the legislature power to enact laws "neces-
sary and proper" for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the
courts (or other departments of goverment), appears to be one of the checks and balances
that is an express exception to the separation of powers doctrine. The anticipated
response to this second criticism is that the issue is so integral to judicial power that it
could not be subject to legislative power, absent an express constitutional provision. Cf.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (limitation of federalism on Con-
gress' power).
104. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
105. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Randall, 209 Md. 18, 120 A.2d 195
(1956).
106. See Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 580, 97 A.2d 449, 454 (1953).
107. Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 293-99, 380 A.2d 12, 20-23 (1977).
108. Id
109. Id at 299-300, 380 A.2d at 23. Cf. Secretary, Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v.
Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 647-48, 409 A.2d 713, 718-19 (1979) (under exceptional cir-
cumstances a court may, in dismissing an appeal, express as dicta its views on the merits).
110. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943).
111. Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12 (1977). As to the prospective
effect of Reyes, see Weiner v. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy, 41 Md. App. 1, 394 A.2d 824
(1978).
112. The requirement is a narrow and technical one under both federal and state law. See
Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 288 n.4, 380 A.2d 12, 17 n.4 (1977), and
sources cited therein.
113. See id at 283, 285, 380 A.2d at 15, 16.
114. Id at 299-300, 380 A.2d at 23-24.
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(iii) Standing. "A personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy" is required by both federal ' 15 and state 16 law. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland has implicitly accepted Supreme Court opin-
ions on the subject as persuasive authority.1 7
The actual or threatened injury required as part of the "personal
stake" includes a wide variety of interests, not just legal rights,
under both federal" 8 and state'1 9 law. However, the federal require-
ment of a nexus between the alleged injury and the challenged con-
duct or the judicial relief requested 2 ' has not yet been considered
under state law.
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Maryland
have spoken as to the standing of a person in a particular role or
status. Only federal law has the special two-part nexus requirement
in federal taxpayer suits.' 2' Both federal'2 2 and state'23 law permit an
action by a state or local taxpayer upon a showing of pocketbook in-
jury. A suit by a person alleging injury only by reason of being a
citizen is barred under federal 24 and state
2 5 law. Neither federal' 26
nor state127 law has definitively resolved the issue of whether a
legislator has standing. Both federal 28 and state'2 9 law permit ac-
tions by an administrative official, charged with enforcing a possi-
bly unconstitutional statute, who is faced with the dilemma of either
losing the job (for not enforcing the statute) or violating the oath to
uphold the constitution (by enforcing the statute). The ability of
115. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
116. DuBois v. City of College Park, 280 Md. 525, 528-29, 375 A.2d 1098, 1101 (1977). See
generally Comment, The 1978 Maryland Environmental Standing Act 8 U. BALT. L. REV.
411 (1979).
117. See Clark v. State, 284 Md. 260, 264, 396 A.2d 243, 246, cert denied 444 U.S. 858 (1979).
But cf Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 392, 216 A.2d 897, 902 (federal
and state law of standing may be different), cert. denied 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
118. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
119. See Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 507-12, 331 A.2d 55,
68-71 (1975). In cases of great public interest, less injury may be required than in other
cases. Mayor of Baltimore v. Concord Baptist Church, Inc., 257 Md. 132, 138, 262 A.2d
755, 759 (1970).
120. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
121. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
122. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
123. James v. Anderson, 281 Md. 137, 377 A.2d 865 (1977).
124. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
125. Ruark v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 157 Md. 576, 588, 146 A. 797, 802
(1929).
126. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). But see Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939) (four Justices, joining in the opinion of the Court on the-merits, concluded that
legislators had no standing; two other Justices dissented).
127. Cf. Hughes v. Maryland Comm., 241 Md. 471, 217 A.2d 273 (intervention as defendant by
legislative sponsor of challenged statute was not questioned by the court of appeals), cert
denied 384 U.S. 950 (1966).
128. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
129. See State's Attorney v. Mayor of Baltimore, 274 Md. 597, 602, 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975).
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political units to sue higher political units on behalf of citizens is
limited under federal 3 ' and state"' law.
Both federal' 32 and state3 3 law generally prohibit a party from
asserting the rights of a third person. There are exceptions. Federal
law permits an injured party to assert the rights of certain third per-
sons, as well as its own rights, in a variety of situations;'34 state law
in the area is undeveloped. Both federal' and state 36 law permit
standing in free expression, vagueness, and overbreadth cases,
where a person may challenge the validity of a statute on its face
although it may be proper as applied to the challenger.
(iv) Mootness. Generally, mootness at any stage bars a case
from being heard in either federal' 37 or state 38 courts. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland has indicated that federal and state law are
similar in this respect.' 39 There are exceptions to the mootness bar.
Both federal140 and state' 4' law permit an otherwise moot case to be
heard if the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Federal law permits a case to be heard when mootness was caused
by voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct;"42 state law on the
subject is unclear.' 43 In addition, the court of appeals has held that
state courts may adjudicate an otherwise moot controversy in cer-
tain cases of urgent and important public concern.
44
130. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (a state, as parens patriae, may not sue the
United States).
131. Duvall v. Lacy, 195 Md. 138, 142-43, 73 A.2d 26, 27-28 (1950) (a municipality, as parens
patriae, may not sue the state).
132. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
133. Clark v. State, 284 Md. 260, 264, 396 A.2d 243, 246, cert denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979).
134. The situations include those in which there is a special relationship between the party and
the third person. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (physician and
patient); NAACP v. Alabama ex. reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (organization and
members); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (seller and buyer of property).
In certain circumstances, federal law permits an association to represent its members
even when there is no injury to the association itself. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
511 (1975). Contra CPHA v. County Executive, 273 Md. 333, 345, 329 A.2d 681, 687-88
(1974).
135. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Cf Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)
(vagueness and overbreadth doctrine does not apply in the case of conduct, only in the
case of "pure" speech).
136. See Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 389 A.2d 341 (1978) (applying federal substantive law).
137. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
138. Attorney Gen. v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass'n, 286 Md. 324, 407
A.2d 749 (1979).
139. State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Myers, 224 Md. 246, 251, 167 A.2d 765, 767 (1961).
140. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
141. See Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379, 381 (1954).
142. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 349 (1974).
143. See Attorney Gen. v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass'n, 286 Md. 324,
327-28, 407 A.2d 749, 751-52 (1979) (cessation of allegedly illegal conduct caused
mootness when cessation was, presumably, involuntary during the term of an injunction
and voluntary afterward).
144. Id at 328, 407 A.2d at 752.
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(v) Ripeness. Ripe or concrete cases, as opposed to those that
are abstract or hypothetical, are generally required by both federal
45
and state146 law. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has noted the
similarity between federal and state law on the subject. 1 7 The
Supreme Court has equivocated between treating ripeness as a dis-
cretionary policy matter and treating it as a mandatory constitu-
tional requirement."'4 The court of appeals, treating the ripeness doc-
trine as a discretionary policy matter, has suggested that state
courts may adjudicate a suit that is not ripe in a narrow class of
cases in which certain compelling circumstances exist.
149
(vi) Political Questions. When a case presents issues more ap-
propriately resolved by the coordinate legislative or executive
branches or by the people, rather than by the judiciary, such issues
are deemed political questions and will not be heard by either
federal'5 ° or state'5 ' courts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has
recognized that the essential nature of the political question doc-
trine, the separation of powers, is the same under both federal and
state law.' 2 Both federal'5 3 and state'5 4 courts have concluded that
the determination of whether or not an issue is a political question is
for the judiciary, as the ultimate interpreter of the constitution. Fed-
eral law includes elaborate formulations describing political ques-
tions;'," state law in the area is undeveloped.
B. Cause of Action
The extent to which federal law and Maryland state law permit a
cause of action for alleged violation of constitutional rights may be
compared using two factors: (1) whether a remedy is expressly pro-
vided by statute or is implied in the constitution; and (2) whether
damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, are available
for violation of constitutional rights.
145. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
146. Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 41, 300 A.2d 367,
374 (1973).
147. Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 472, 71 A.2d 474, 478 (1950).
148. Compare Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972), as interpreted in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114-17 (1976) (policy requirement subject to an exception
when Congress has provided for review) with Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S.
289, 297-305 (1979) (constitutional requirement).
149. See Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 299-300, 380 A.2d 12, 23 (1977).
150. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
151. Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377
U.S. 656 (1964).
152. See id. at 426-28, 180 A.2d at 663-64.
153. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
154. Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 426-27,180 A.2d 656,663 (1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
155. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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1. Remedy Expressly Provided by Statute or Implied in Con-
stitution. Remedies for violations of federal constitutional rights 56
are either provided expressly by statute'57 or implied in the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 8 Remedies for violations of state constitu-
tional rights are implied in the Constitution of Maryland.59
2. Damages as well as Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Both
federal'6 ° and state'"' law provide injunctive and declaratory relief for
violation of rights under the respective constitutions. Federal law
provides damages for violation of certain constitutional rights.162
156. As to the elements of a cause of action for violation of federal constitutional rights, com-
pare Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980) (by implication) (deprivation of a constitu-
tional right and governmental action are elements; good faith and reasonable belief consti-
tute an affirmative defense) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(discriminatory purpose or intent is an element in certain equal protection cases).
157. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). Section 1983 grants a remedy for violation of
constitutional rights by "state action" and provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Other federal statutes provide remedies for violations of particular constitutional rights
by private action. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (discrimination against contract rights); 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) (discrimination against property rights). Still other federal statutes,
based on Congress' power to regulate commerce and to enforce equal protection, provide
remedies against federal, state, or private violations. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976) (dis-
crimination in public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (discrimination in
employment); 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976) (discrimination in housing).
158. A remedy for violation of certain rights by federal action is implied in the Constitution.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
159. See Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951). See also, e.g., MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 12-707 (Supp. 1979) (state remedial statutes based on the police power,
rather than on the power to enforce constitutional rights) (non-discrimination in credit).
Cf, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 1-28 (1979) (state remedial statutes, based on the
police power, authorizing a public cause of action) (Human Relations Commission
authorized to enforce non-discrimination in public accommodations, employment, and
housing).
160. The Supreme Court has assumed that injunctive relief, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), and declaratory relief, see Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), are available for violation of rights under the Constitution
of the United States. The relief in Mitchum and Steffel was provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
(Supp. I I I 1979), see note 157 supra The relief in Frontiero and Duke Power was implicitly
provided by the relevant constitutional provision.
161. Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church v. State Highway Admin., 276 Md. 630, 350 A.2d 125
(1976) (equitable relief available); see Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944)
(declaratory relief available).
162. Regarding suits against state officials, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) (constitu-
tional rights generally) and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Regarding suits against
federal officials, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth
amendment search and seizure); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment
due process and equal protection); and Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980) (fifth
amendment due process and equal protection and eighth amendment cruel and unusual
punishment). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (reserving issue of damages
for violation of first amendment expression, fifth amendment due process, and consti-
tutional right of privacy). It is not clear whether there is a Bivens-type action available for
claims based on deprivation of property, as well as liberty. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
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Actions for judicial review of violation of constitutional rights
are subject to various governmental and official immunities164 under
both federal and Maryland law. 165 The immunities provided by
federal and state law may be compared by considering, generally, the
sources of the immunities and their contents and, specifically, the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398 (1979). But cf Lynch v. Household
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (distinction between personal and property rights re-
jected in the context of actions against state government officials).
As to the availability of punitive damages, see Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468,
1473-74 (1980).
163. The following considerations suggest a cause of action for damages for violation of state
constitutional rights. First, MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19 suggests, albeit some-
what circularly, that there is a remedy for such injury. Article 19 provides in pertinent
part: "That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have
remedy by the course of the Law of the land ... " Second, two authorities have suggested
that the due process provisions of the state constitution support a private cause of action
for damages. See Davidson v. Koerber, 454 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Md. 1978) (cause of action
under DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23, now art. 24, is analogous to cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Supp. III 1979)); NILES, supra note 39, at 192-93 (1915) (due process and separa-
tion of powers provisions of the constitution would have secured compensation in cases of
eminent domain even before a just compensation provision was adopted). Third, other
remedies for violation of constitutional rights have been implied. See Weyler v. Gibson,
110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261 (1909) (ejectment); notes 159 & 161 supra (injunctive and
declaratory relief). Note that the existence of other remedies was one basis for the decision
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the first federal case to im-
ply a cause of action for damages for violation of federal constitutional rights. Fourth,
many of the rights in the Constitution of Maryland have been construed similarly to the
rights in the Constitution of the United States. See generally Rees, supra note 1, at 326.
Certain rights in the Federal Constitution support a private cause of action for damages.
See note 162 supra. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). Fifth, to deny a cause of action
for damages in state courts for violation of state constitutional rights would be
anomalous in view of the availability of a cause of action for damages in state courts for
violation of federal constitutional rights. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
On the other hand, the following considerations suggest that no cause of action for
damages for violation of state constitutional rights may be available. First, there exists no
state statute analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979), even though the legislature
has broad powers to execute duties imposed by the state constitution on the state govern-
ment. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 56. Presumably, those duties include protecting the
rights granted to individuals in the constitution. Second, there exists no state tradition of
implying in statutes causes of action for damages. See, e.g., Dillon v. Great AtL & Pac.
Tea Co., 43 Md. App. 161, 403 A.2d 406 (1979). But cf Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md.
242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965) (the violation of a statute, which is a cause of injury, is evidence
of negligence). See also Pitman v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 279 Md. 313,
316-17,368 A.2d 473,476 (1977). Note that the federal tradition of implying causes of ac-
tion for damages in statutes was one of the bases for the decision in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
164. Regarding the immunities of foreign governments, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1607 (Supp. III
1979).
165. It is unclear whether the immunities are the same in cases alleging violation of constitu-
tional rights as in cases alleging violation of other rights (statutory or common law). This
distinction was noted, but decision on the issue was reserved, in Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 489, 495 (1978) (executive immunity). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555
(1967). The Court of Appeals of Maryland has been silent on the issue.
Whether immunities should be abolished both in cases alleging violation of constitu-
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immunities afforded governmental entities and governmental
officials.
1. General Considerations.
(a) Sources. Whether the federal and state immunity doctrines
are based on the respective constitutions, rather than on common
law, determines whether the doctrines may be substantially
tional rights and in other cases is beyond the scope of this article. Note, however, that,
aside from the allocation of the burdens of pleading and proof, see Gomez v. Toledo, 100
S.Ct. 1920 (1980), the qualified immunity for executive officials under federal law, in effect,
makes them liable for negligent or intentional violations of constitutional rights; that is,
they are immunized only from strict liability.
There are good reasons to recognize the distinction by permitting a lesser immunity
(or no immunity) in cases alleging violation of constitutional rights than in other cases.
First, recognizing the distinction would reflect the essential role of judicial review in our
system, particularly when no other judicial remedy for the constitutional wrong exists.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 409-10 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring) (damages was the only possible remedy for illegal search and seizure).
Second, recognizing the distinction would reflect the difference between the lawmak-
ing roles of Congress and the courts in constitutional matters and those lawmaking roles
in matters not of constitutional magnitude. In constitutional matters, those roles are
primarily to interpret the Constitution, not to make law. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 491 n.15 (1978) (early doubt that Congress [a fortiori, the courts] could immunize
federal officials from constitutional claims). But cf id at 500, 504 (suggestion that Con-
gress may immunize federal officials from constitutional claims); id at 501-02 (im-
munities of federal officials are largely of judicial creation). In other matters within their
competences, Congress is free to make law and the courts are free to develop the common
law. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Third, recognition of the distinction would comport with holdings that at least one
constitutional right, just compensation, constitutes a waiver of governmental immunity.
See notes 184 & 185 infru see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682,704 (1949) (dictum) (judicial relief for violation of constitutional rights by govern-
mental action).
Note that MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5, which maintains in force the English
common law as it existed on July 4, 1776, does not "constitutionalize" the common law,
because that provision expressly authorizes the legislature to amend or repeal the com-
mon law and implicitly authorizes the courts to determine which parts of the common law
are applicable in Maryland and are consistent with the constitution. State v. Buchanan, 5
H. & J. 317, 358-59 (Md. 1821).
There are good reasons, however, to believe that courts, both federal and state, will
not distinguish between cases involving claims of violation of constitutional rights and
other cases in deciding what immunities are to be permitted. First, many of the early,
seminal immunity cases involved claims of rights not of a constitutional nature. E.g.,
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 170 (1881) (common law claim); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 WalL) 335, 337-39 (1872) (common law claim).
Second, in determining the nature of immunity in cases claiming violation of constitu-
tional rights, the Supreme Court has looked to immunities existing at common law that
were mostly developed in cases in which the claims of right were not of a constitutional
nature. E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
Third, under current federal law, the immunities of the federal government, state gov-
ernment, legislative officials, and judicial officials are identical, regardless of whether the
claims are for violation of constitutional rights. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 11, 123
(1979) (dictum) (absolute immunity of legislative officials to common law claim); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (absolute judicial immunity to constitutional claim);
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (absolute immunity of
legislative officials to constitutional claim); Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651 (1971) (ab-
solute immunity of state government to constitutional claim); Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (absolute immunity of federal government
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modified only by amendment of the constitutions or whether they
may be modified by the courts or by the legislature.166
to common law claim); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913) (absolute judicial immunity
to common law claim); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) (dictum) (absolute
immunity of federal government to constitutional claim); O'Neill v. Pennsylvania, 459
F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972) (absolute immunity of state government to common law claim). Ap-
parently, it is only in the immunities of executive officials that there may be a distinction.
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489, 495 (1978).
Fourth, in many cases, claims of violation of constitutional rights are interwoven with
other claims in one or more of several ways. For example, the facts may support claims of
both constitutional and common law rights. E.g., id at 482-83 & n.5. In addition, most
claims of violation of common law or statutory rights by the government can easily be
cast in terms of claims of violation of constitutional rights, such as due process. Id at 522
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But cf Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976) (Federal Constitution and civil rights statutes do not create a body of general
federal tort law). Moreover, allowing an immunity in a case in which common law or
statutory rights are involved may implicate constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection, see Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 66-67, 405 A.2d 255, 263
(1979) (common law negligence claim), or impairment of contracts, but cf. Maryland Port
Admin. v. I.T.O. Corp., 40 Md. App. 697, 711-12, 395 A.2d 145, 153 (1978) (no impair-
ment in that courts were powerless to enforce a remedy because of governmental immu-
nity). Similarly, a constitutional claim may be incorporated in a common law claim, cf.
Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965) (violation of statute [or, by
hypothesis, constitution] may be evidence of negligence), or in a statutory claim, see 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. III 1979) (Federal Tort Claims Act makes United States liable if a
private person would be liable in accordance with the law [by hypothesis, including the
state constitution] of the place where the act occurred).
Fifth, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,497 (1978), where the distinction was empha-
sized, the policy bases for executive immunity (injustice to executive exercising discretion
in good faith and deterrence of decisive exercise of executive judgment) appear to apply
equally to cases involving claims of violation of constitutional rights and to other claims.
See id at 522-23, 526-28 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Sixth, on one occasion Congress, in waiving the immunity of the United States, has
treated a violation of constitutional rights like a violation of the common law. See S. REP.
No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2789,
2791 (amendment to Federal Tort Claims Act, which deprived United States of defense of
governmental immunity in common law and "constitutional" tort cases involving federal
law enforcement officers). But cf Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d
Cir. 1978) (federal constitutional torts are not actionable under the Act because of the ex-
press incorporation of local law causes of action). See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Assuming that the courts do not distinguish between cases alleging violation of con-
stitutional rights and other cases in deciding what immunities are to be permitted, the
constitutional causes may be analogized to common law causes of action, such as tort or
contract, to determine whether an immunity exists or to determine which statute may
waive an immunity. Cf Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 110 F.2d 15 (3d Cir.
1939) (statutory cause of action analogized to common law form of action to determine
what statutory period of limitations applied), cert denied, 310 U.S. 639 (1940). Most of the
rights protected by the Constitution appear to be tort-like rights, Le., interests in liberty
of person or in security of person and property, see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (4th
ed. 1971), except the right of just compensation, U.S. CONST. amend. V; MD. CONST. art.
III, §§ 40-40C, arts. XI-B to -D, which appears to be in the nature of a contract implied
in law, see Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). More broadly, however, all consti-
tutional rights may be considered as arising from the "social compact," that is, contrac-
tual in nature. See J. ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL (Paris 1762). See generally
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803); U.S. CONST. preamble.
166. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500, 504 (1978); Dilasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512,
523, 197 A.2d 245, 251 (1964). Cf notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra (implica-
tions of the sources of federal and state justiciability doctrines).
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(b) Nature. Federal and state immunities are either absolute or
qualified. The nature of these immunities has a number of procedural
implications. With respect to pleading, an absolute governmental im-
munity is jurisdictional 67 and, therefore, may be raised preliminarily
or at any other time by the parties or by the court.1 6 An absolute
official immunity may be raised at an early stage,'6 9 but is waived if
not timely raised. 70 A qualified official immunity is an affirmative
defense" ' and is waived if not timely raised.' 2 As to relief, an abso-
lute immunity may bar an action for injunctive or declaratory relief
as well as for damages.'7 3 A qualified immunity is a defense to an ac-
tion for damages, but not to an action for declaratory or injunctive
relief.'74 With regard to subsequent proceedings, the finding of an
absolute immunity is determinative of the case, 75 while the finding
of a qualified immunity ordinarily requires a trial on the merits.7 6
2. Specific Considerations.
(a) Governmental Immunities. The United States and its agen-
cies' 7 and the Maryland state government and its agencies'78 have
167. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (eleventh amendment immunity of
states); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587-91 (1941) (federal governmental
immunity); Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 346, 278 A.2d 71, 72-73
(1971) (state governmental immunity); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Md. R.P. 323(a)(9), (b); 14 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654 n.4 (1976 &
Supp. 1979).
168. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (eleventh amendment immunity of
states); Board of Trustees v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 583, 366 A.2d 360, 362
(1976) (governmental immunity under Maryland law); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); MD. R.P.
323(b), 885, 1085.
169. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 416 (1976) (absolute quasi-judicial immunity);
DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 523, 197 A.2d 245, 249-50 (1964) (same); FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim); MD. R.P. 345 (demurrer); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 n.2 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
170. See Legum v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 180 Md. 356, 360, 24 A.2d 281, 283 (1942) (dictum)
(demurrer waived if other pleadings are filed); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2); MD. R.P. 885, 1085.
171. Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980). See Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. v. Pollitt, 220
Md. 132, 137-38, 151 A.2d 530, 533 (1959) (defense may be proved under general issue
plea).
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 12(a)-(b); MD. R.P. 885, 1085.
173. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975) (federal legislative
immunity). Cf Supreme Ct. v. Consumers Union, 100 S. Ct. 1967, 1976 (1980) (whether
prospective relief against judges is possible is open to debate). But cf Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975) (prospective relief against prosecutor); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37
A.2d 880 (1944) (governmental immunity under Maryland law).
174. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314-15 n.6 (1975); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908); Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 284-88, 159 A. 751, 755-56, appeal dismissed and
eert denied, 287 U.S. 564 (1932).
175. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (federal legislative immunity); Robin-
son v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 344-45, 278 A.2d 71, 73 (1971) (Maryland
governmental immunity).
176. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 250 (1974) (executive immunity - trial to determine
reasonableness and good faith under federal law); Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 585-86,
177 A.2d 841, 845 (1962) (executive immunity - trial to determine good faith under state
law).
177. Regarding which federal agencies are immune, see Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381 (1939), and
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 146 n.4 (1971).
178. Regarding which state agencies are immune, see Katz v. WSSC, 284 Md. 503, 397 A.2d
1027 (1979) (WSSC is a state agency, but its immunity has been waived by statute);
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absolute immunity to suit, according to both federal 79 and state'8 °
law. Counties, municipalities, and other local governments ordinarily
have no immunity under federal law.' s They are immune under state
law to tort actions for their "governmental functions," but not to
0 & B, Inc. v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 279 Md. 459, 369 A.2d
553 (1977) (the Commission is a state agency and is immune); Board of Trustees v. John
K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 366 A.2d 360 (1976) (state college is a state agency and is im-
mune); Bolick v. Board of Educ., 256 Md. 180, 260 A.2d 31 (1969) (local public school
boards are immune, not because they are state agencies, but because they have neither
funds available to pay damages nor the power to raise such funds by taxation).
179. The United States is immune to suit in federal courts as a matter of federal common law.
See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882); The Siren v. United States, 74 U.S. (7
Wall) 152, 153-54 (1869). Cf Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 572-74 (1933) (im-
plicit in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cL 1), disapproved in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 562-66 (1962) (Harlan, J., opinion for the Court joined by two other justices).
The state is immune to suit in federal courts under U.S. CONST. amend. XI (suit by a
citizen of another state or of a foreign state), as extended by Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890) (suit by a citizen of the state). But cf United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128
(1965) (no immunity to suit by United States); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365
(1923) (no immunity to suit by another state). The eleventh amendment immunity,
although expressed as a withdrawal of the federal judicial power, may be waived in the
course of litigation by the state. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
180. The immunity of the United States, as a matter of federal common law, is entitled to
supremacy in state courts under the federal supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2,
and the state supremacy clause, MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 2. See United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) (United States cannot be sued without its consent in any
case); Anderson v. Anderson, 285 Md. 515, 404 A.2d 275 (1979) (federal statutory waiver
of immunity). Cf notes 197, 200 & 217 infra (immunity of federal legislative, executive,
and judicial officials in state courts). For examples of diversity cases holding that federal
common law governs in areas of federal authority when uniformity is desirable, see
Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (immunity of federal official to state law action),
and Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (rights of the United States
on its commercial paper). In the context of a suit in state court, the governmental immun-
ity of the United States has a constitutional dimension of federalism. See Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920) (federal immunity to state regulations); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (federal immunity to state taxation). Cf Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (immunity of foreign government im-
plicates international affairs and the separation of powers between federal executive and
judicial branches in diversity case in federal court).
The state is immune from suit based on federal claims in state courts as a matter of
federal common law. Cf Martinez v. California, 100 S. Ct. 553, 558 (1980) (federal claim
against state official); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (federal claim in federal court).
The state is immune from suit based on state claims in state courts as a matter of state
common law. Board of Trustees v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 366 A.2d 360 (1976)
(contract immunity); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 287 A.2d 40 (1972)
(tort immunity). But cf State ex rel Lane v. Dashiell, 195 Md. 677, 75 A.2d 348 (1950)
(notwithstanding governmental immunity, the state has a moral obligation for its con-
tracts). See generally Report of the Governor's Commission to Study Sovereign Immunity
(1976); Comment, Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Contract Cases in Maryland, 6 U.
BALT. L. REV. 337 (1977); Comment, The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of
Sovereign Immunity in Tort in Maryland 36 MD. L. REV. 653 (1977).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ordinarily does not immunize local governments. See Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1978); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S.
529 (1890). The general federal civil rights remedial statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp.
III 1979), provides no immunity for local governments, Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), regardless of whether they would be immune to suit in state
court, Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1407, 1414 n.30 (1980), and
regardless of whether their agents would be immune, id at 1409. But cf Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 694 (local governments not liable under § 1983 solely on
a respondeat superior theory for actions of an agent).
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tort actions for their "proprietary functions"1s2 or to most contract
actions.' 3
Governmental immunity may be waived by federal"' or state 5
constitutional provision or by federal' 86 or state18  statute. The
182. Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 405 A.2d 255 (1979). See also Clarke,
Municipal Responsibility in Tort in Maryland 3 MD. L. REV. 159 (1939). Local govern-
ments may be held liable under a respondeat superior theory for "proprietary function"
torts of their agents, if the agents are themselves liable. See Bradshaw v. Prince George's'
County, 284 Md. 294, 300, 396 A.2d 255, 262 (1979) (by implication). When local govern-
ments are to be sued, notice of the claim must be given within 180 days after the injury.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-306 (1980).
183. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 1A (Supp. 1979) (municipalities); id at art. 25, § IA (commis-
sioners counties); id at art. 25A, § 1A (chartered counties); id at art. 25B, § 13A (code
counties) (actions on written contracts). The extent of local governments' immunity to
contract actions prior to the legislation cited above and, by hypothesis, the current rule as
to immunity on contracts other than written ones is discussed in American Structures,
Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55 (1976).
184. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218-23 (1882) (U.S. CONST. amend. V, just com-
pensation clause). Cf Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 697
nn. 17 & 18 (1949) (fifth amendment not violated when there is a statutory remedy for
compensation against the United States).
185. See Herilla v. Mayor of Baltimore, 37 Md. App. 481, 489-92, 378 A.2d 162, 168 (1977)
(U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19 due process clauses
implying just compensation). But cf Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 289,159 A.2d 751, 757
(state does not have to consent to suit in condemnation proceedings), appeal dismissed
and cert denied, 287 U.S. 564 (1932).
186. Federal statutes waiving the immunity of the United States include the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) (actions in federal court seeking relief other than
money damages); the Federal Tort Claims Act, particularly 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674
(1976) (actions in tort for money damages); the Tucker Act, particularly 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(a)(2), 1491 (Supp. III 1979) (actions in contract for money damages); and acts
authorizing governmental agencies to sue and be sued, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1976)
(Postal Service); see FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200e-16(a) (1976) (actions based on discrimination in employment in
federal competitive service). See also 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3656 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
Federal statutes waiving the immunity of the states include Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976) (actions based on discrimination in state
and local governmental employment); see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), and
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. III 1979);
see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). But cf Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)
(general federal civil rights remedial statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979), does not
authorize an action against a state); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (application of wage and hour provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act to state and
local governmental employees violates constitutional concept of state sovereignty).
187. State laws waiving the immunity of the state include MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 10A (1978)
(actions on written contract), and MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-105, 13-108, 14-109, 16-206
(1978) (actions on claims not in excess of insurance policy limits against local school
boards, the University of Maryland, state universities and colleges, and community col-
leges, respectively). Note that only § 4-105 uses mandatory "shall" carry insurance
language and expressly prohibits raising the immunity defense to claims of $100,000 or
less. Revisor's Notes to the other sections cited above indicate that those provisions are
dormant because insurance was not obtained. See Board of Trustees v. John K. Ruff, Inc.,
278 Md. 580, 585, 366 A.2d 360, 363 (1976). Other statutes waiving the state's immunity
include MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 7-702 (1977) (actions against the Mass Transit Ad-
ministration for its contracts and torts and the torts of its officers, agents, and
employees); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 3-216(d), 6-204(b), 6-206(b) (1977) (actions arising
out of Maryland Port Administration's ownership, control, or operation of docks and
wharves, see Maryland Port Admin. v. SS American Legend, 435 F. Supp. 584 (D. Md.
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waiver must be express or necessarily implied under both federal""8
and state' 9 law. Waiver of governmental immunity under state law,
unlike federal law, requires that the agency have funds available for
the satisfaction of any judgment or have the authority to raise such
funds by taxation.' 90 Both federal"' and state'92 law permit govern-
1978); but cf Maryland Port Admin. v. I.T.O. Corp., 40 Md. App. 697,395 A.2d 145 (1978)
(Maryland Port Administration immune to contract action brought on contract with its
predecessor agency which was not immune)); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 19-101, 19-102
(1977) (actions for negligence of police officers who direct drivers' assistance or for strict
liability of police officers commandeering vehicles for use in roadblocks); MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 12-111(c) (1974) (actions for damage or destruction to property by certain
civil engineers, surveyors, or real estate appraisers); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 64 (1978)
(actions against authority requesting special police); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 266P(4),
266S, 266V (1978) (actions against Maryland Industrial Development Financing Author-
ity); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 412(a), 420, 425 (1978 & Supp. 1979) (actions against
Maryland Food Center Authority); MD. R.P. 882(f), 1082(f) (costs on appeal in actions
against the state or its agencies). Statutory provision for the state's indemnification of its
officers or employees expressly does not waive the state's immunity, MD. ANN. CODE art.
78A, § 16C(c) (Supp. 1979), although the state is authorized to insure or self-insure against
such indemnification, MD. ANN. CODE art. 95, § 27(a)(5) (Supp. 1978). The voluntary carry-
ing of liability insurance does not waive the state's immunity. Jones v. Scofield Bros., 73
F. Supp. 395 (D. Md. 1947).
One of the statutes waiving the immunity of local governments is MD. ANN. CODE art.
82, §§ 1-4 (1975) (actions for injury to or destruction of property in riots). See Mayor of
Baltimore v. Silver, 263 Md. 439, 283 A.2d 788 (1971) (immunity of Baltimore City is
waived although its police are under state control), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
Other such statutes include MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 19-101, 19-102 (1977); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 12-111(c) (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 64 (1978); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, §§ 272(a)(3), 274, 276 (Supp. 1979) (actions against county parking authorities);
and provisions cited in note 183 supra.
State statutes authorizing certain local governments to waive their immunity to tort
actions include MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 1B (Supp. 1979) (municipalities), and MD. ANN.
CODE art. 25A, § 5(CC) (Supp. 1979) (chartered counties). Prior to these statutes, the ex-
istence of "home rule" powers was interpreted as authorizing the waiver. Bradshaw v.
Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 396 A.2d 255 (1979). The waiver of local govern-
ment tort immunity has been interpreted broadly to make the state liable for the
negligence of an employee who may have "public official" immunity. See James v. Prince
George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980).
Another exception to the immunity of local governments arises when a local govern-
ment wilfully or negligently fails to prevent or abate a public nuisance on its property. See
Fowler v. Board of County Comm'rs, 230 Md. 504, 507, 187 A.2d 856, 858 (dictum), cert
denied 375 U.S. 845 (1963). But cf Spriggs v. Levitt & Sons, 267 Md. 679, 298 A.2d 442
(1973) (no exception when a state agency is defendant). Whether there is another excep-
tion when a local government is subject to an estoppel is unsettled. See Carey v.
Baltimore County, 262 Md. 491, 498-99, 278 A.2d 6, 9-10 (1971). The voluntary carry-
ing of liability insurance does not waive a local government's immunity. Quecedo v. Mont-
gomery County, 264 Md. 590, 287 A.2d 257 (1972).
188. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940). But cf Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447
(1883) (eleventh amendment immunity of state may be waived in the course of litigation).
189. Board of Educ. v. Alcrymat Corp., 258 Md. 508, 516, 266 A.2d 349, 353 (1970). The re-
quirements of federal and state law are similar in this respect. Id
190. University of Maryland v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 557-59, 197 A. 123, 125 (1938).
191. Federal law permits a federal official to be sued in federal court, Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690-91, 702 (1949), subject to certain limitations,
id at 691 n.11 (neither affirmative action by government nor disposition of unques-
tionably government property may be requested). Federal law also permits a state official
to be sued in federal court. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
192. Regarding whether a federal official may be sued in state court, compare Tarble's Case, 80
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mental immunity to be avoided by an action for prospective relief
against an executive official who has acted unconstitutionally.
(b) Official Immunities. Both federal and state law provide im-
munity for legislative, executive, and judicial officials. Of course,
those officials may be liable personally for actions not taken in an
official capacity.
1 93
(i) Legislative Immunities. Legislators are absolutely immune
to suit 94 for their "legislative"- acts 95 under both federal'9 and
U.S. (13 Wall) 397 (1872) with Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 502 n.30 (1978) (dictum).
See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 4"27-31 (2d ed. 1973).
State law permits a state official to be sued in state court. Dunne v. State, 162 Md.
274, 284-86, 159 A. 751, 756 (dictum), appeal dismissed and cert denied, 287 U.S. 564
(1932).
193. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state official's liability under federal law); Lar-
son v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 686 (1949) (dictum) (federal offi-
cial's liability under federal law); Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 582-83, 584, 177 A.2d
841, 844 (1962) (by implication) (federal official's liability under state law); Phoebus v.
Sterling, 174 Md. 394, 397-98, 198 A. 717, 719 (1938) (state official's liability under state
law).
194. The immunity is to suit for declaratory or injunctive relief as well as for damages.
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,503 (1975). The immunity ap-
plies even in the presence of malice. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951). There
are no state cases dealing with either of these points. But see note 197 infra (state law con-
strued in pari materia with federal law).
195. The scope of "legislative" acts is considered in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
(1979), and Blondes v. State, 16 Md. App. 165, 294 A.2d 661 (1972). Whether legislators
have a qualified immunity for acts that are not "legislative" is questionable. Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246 n.25 (1979).
With regard to who is immune, federal law protects legislative aides to the extent
that their conduct would be protected if performed by a legislator. Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). But cf Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 501-06 (1969)
(legislative employees executing legislators' orders were not immune). State law in the
area is undeveloped. But see note 197 infra (state law construed in pai materia with
federal law).
196. Federal legislators are immune to suit in federal court under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cL 1,
the speech and debate clause, and to suit in state court under that clause and under U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, cL 2, the supremacy clause. Cf Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881)
(federal legislators immune to common law action in the District of Columbia local courts);
note 180 supra (federal governmental immunity under common law is entitled to
supremacy in state courts).
As a matter of federal common law, state legislators are immune to suit based on
federal claims in federal court. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 404 (1979). Whether local government legislators, as a matter
of federal common law, are similarly immune is not settled. Id at 404 n.26. By hypothesis,
state and local legislators' immunity to suit based on state claims in federal court is a mat-
ter of state law.
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state 97 law. Whether legislative immunity may be waived, either by
statute or by a legislator, is unsettled. 98
(ii) Executive Immunities. Both federal1 99 and state00 law pro-
vide a qualified immunity20' in suits for damages against executive
197. Federal legislators are immune to suit in state court under the Federal Constitution, see
note 196 suprm, which is also made supreme as a matter of state constitutional law. MD.
CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 2. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976) (removal to federal courts of
suits in state courts against federal officers); note 180 supra (immunity of federal govern-
ment in state courts).
State and, by hypothesis, local legislators are immune to suit based on federal claims
in state court as a matter of federal common law. Cf Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
282 (1980) (claim against state executive official under general federal civil rights remedial
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979)). State legislators are immune to suit based on
state claims in state court under MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 10 and MD. CONST. art.
III, § 18, the speech and debate clauses. These clauses have been construed in pan
materia with the federal speech and debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Blondes v.
State, 16 Md. App. 165, 175, 294 A.2d 661, 666 (1972). See also NILEs, supra note 39, at
13, 22, 143 (federal and state clauses are similar).
Local government legislators are immune to suit in state court by statute. MD. C's. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-304 (1980).
198. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490, 493 (1979).
199. Federal executive officials are qualifiedly immune to suit in federal court as a matter of
federal common law. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 501-03 (1978) (federal consti-
tutional claims).
State executive officials, as a matter of federal common law, are qualifiedly immune
to suit based on federal claims in federal court. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241
(1974) (federal constitutional claims). By hypothesis, state and local executive officials' im-
munity to suit based on state claims in federal court is a matter of state law. Local govern-
ment executive officials, as a matter of federal common law, are qualifiedly immune to suit
based on federal claims in federal court. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967)
(federal constitutional claims).
200. The qualified immunity of federal executive officials, as a matter of federal common law, is
entitled to supremacy in state courts under U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 and MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 2. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (dictum) (state
claim). Cf Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (federal immunity applies to state law ac-
tion in federal diversity case); Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 583-84, 177 A.2d 841, 844
(1962) (absolute federal immunity accorded in suit based on common law claims); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1442, 1442a (1976) (removal to federal courts of suits in state courts against federal offi-
cers); note 180 supra (immunity of federal government in state courts). Regarding the con-
stitutional problem of a suit in state court against a federal official, see note 192 supra
State and local government executive officials are qualifiedly immune to suit based
on federal claims in state court as a matter of federal common law. Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980) (claim under general federal civil rights remedial statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979)). State and county executive officials are qualifiedly im-
mune to suit based on state claims in state courts as a matter of state common law. See
Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 104, 271 A.2d 547, 550 (1970) (dictum) (suit based on
common law claims). In adopting a qualified immunity, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
in Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 347, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (suit
based on common law claims), rejected an absolute immunity by analogy to that of federal
officials under Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (suit based on common law claim). But
cf Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 562, 414 A.2d 914, 924 (1980) (governor's executive
privilege analogized to that of the President); Miles v. Bradford, 22 Md. 170, 184-85
(1864) (in suit for mandamus, governor's immunity analogized to that of the President).
By statute, municipal executive officials are qualifiedly immune to certain suits based
on state claims in state courts. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 1B (Supp. 1979).
201. In exceptional circumstances, federal executive officials may have an absolute immunity
to suit. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 507 (1978).
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officials for discretionary22 "executive" acts.20 3 Executive officials
have no immunity, however, to suits for damages caused by their
ministerial acts, according to both federal °4 and state0 5 law. In addi-
tion, executive officials have no immunity to suits for injunctive or
declaratory relief under either federal20 6 or state2 7 law.
The federal and state qualified immunities for executive officials
differ in two respects. First, the federal immunity apparently covers
all members of the executive branch who exercise discretionary ex-
ecutive functions."°' The state immunity covers only "public offi-
202. The distinction between "discretionary" and "ministerial" acts has been criticized. See
Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1414 n.31 (1980); Byse & Fiocca, Section
1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 192 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of
Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308, 333-35 (1967). Nonetheless, the
distinction survives in the cases. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 507 (1978);
James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980).
203. The immunity includes only acts within the scope of the official's authority. See Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 497 (1978); Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294,
302-03, 396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979). In addition, the immunity, at least under federal law, in-
cludes only acts that are functionally "executive" in nature. Executive officials exercising
judicial or prosecutorial functions are absolutely immune as judicial or quasi-judicial offi-
cials. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 512-13, 517 (federal agency officials exercising
judicial or prosecutorial functions); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prose-
cutor). Whether executive officials exercising legislative functions are absolutely immune
as legislative officials is unresolved. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1025 (D.
Md. 1976) (no immunity in a criminal prosecution under the circumstances), affd by an
equally divided cour4 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (in banc), cert denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647
(1980).
204. Federal and state executive officials are subject to suit in federal court for damages
caused by their malicious or negligent performance of ministerial acts, see Bates v. Clark,
95 U.S. 204 (1877) (dictum) (federal executive); Amy v. Barkholder, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136
(1871) (state executive), or strictly for ministerial acts beyond their authority, Chaffin v.
Taylor, 114 U.S. 309 (1885) (state executive); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) (federal ex-
ecutive). But cf 22 U.S.C. § 817(a) (1976) (Federal Tort Claims Act remedy against United
States is exclusive); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (Supp. III 1979) (Federal Tort Claims Act remedy
against United States is exclusive in certain cases).
205. Federal executive officials are subject to suit in state court for damages caused by their
malicious or negligent performance of ministerial acts, see Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 334 (1866), or strictly for ministerial acts beyond their authority, Teal v. Felton, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852), as a matter of federal law. But cf notes 192 & 204 supra (divi-
sion of opinion as to whether a federal official may be sued in state court and exclusive
Federal Tort Claims Act remedy in certain cases). State law apparently permits such
suits. See Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920) (reversing state court judgment); Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (same).
State and local government executive officials are subject to suit in state court for
damages caused by their malicious or negligent performance of ministerial acts. See
James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980).
206. See note 191 supra. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) (mandamus remedy).
207. See note 192 supra. See also MD. C'S. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-8A-01, -02 (1980); MD.
R.P. BE40-46 (mandamus remedy).
208. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,
561 n.7 (1978); id at 568, 569 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974) (immunity covered enlisted state National Guard personnel). But cf Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (distinction among officers, inferior officers, and
employees - "lesser functionaries subordinate to officers"); Grossman v. McKay, 384 F.
Supp. 99 (D. Md. 1974) (immunity only covers officials of "suitable rank"); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (distinction between "officers" and "inferior officers").
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cials" (not other public officers, agents, and employees2 9 ) who exer-
cise discretionary executive functions. 10 Second, the federal immu-
nity requires the absence of both malice and negligence.2" ' The state
immunity requires only the absence of malice, regardless of
negligence.2 '
(iii) Judicial Immunities. Judges2 3 are absolutely immune"4 to
suit for their "judicial" acts" 5 under both federa 2 16 and state211 law.
209. Some of these other persons are granted a measure of immunity by statute. E.g., MD.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 6-109 (1978) (school employees who make certain reports or partici-
pate in certain proceedings); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 132B (1980) (medical personnel par-
ticipating in immunization projects); id § 556A (1980) (medical personnel taking blood
samples or making blood tests at direction of law enforcement officers).
210. James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980).
211. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (federal officials); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975) (state officials).
212. See James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980). Compare the
state immunity requirement with the standard requiring the absence of malice or gross
negligence for state defense, MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 12A (Supp. 1979), or indemnifica-
tion, MD. ANN. CODE art. 78A, § 16C(a)(4), (b)(4) (Supp. 1979), of state officials.
213. According to federal law, judges of general or appellate jurisdiction are immune, unless
they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356
(1978). Judges of limited jurisdiction are immune only when acting within their jurisdic-
tion. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535-36 (1869) (dictum). State law in this
area is undeveloped.
Other participants in judicial proceedings, such as lawyers, parties, witnesses, jurors,
and judicial employees, may have a quasi-judicial or derivative immunity for their words
or acts. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
423 & n.20 (1976). But cf Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979) (as a matter of federal
law, court-appointed lawyer in federal criminal case has no immunity to state law claim for
malpractice). With regard to state law, see Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 Md. 699, 402 A.2d
897 (1979), and DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245 (1964).
214. The immunity applies even for malicious acts. Bradley v. Fisher, 78 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1872), approved in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 n.5 (1978); DiBlasio v.
Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 522, 523, 197 A.2d 245, 250 (1964) (dictum); Roth v. Shupp, 94 Md.
55, 59-60, 50 A. 430, 431-32 (1901) (dictum). But cf Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356,
196 A.2d 887, 889-90 (1964) (dictum) (absence of malice required for immunity to apply);
State v. Carrick, 70 Md. 586, 588, 17 A. 559, 559 (1889) (dictum) (same); Knell v. Briscoe,
49 Md. 414, 416-17 (1878) (same); Hiss v. State, 24 Md. 556, 561-62 (1866) (same);
Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479, 483-84 (1862) (same).
215. The scope of "judicial" acts is considered in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and
Roth v. Shupp, 94 Md. 55, 50 A. 430 (1901). Judges have no immunity for "ministerial"
acts. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 567 n.6 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1880); State v. Carrick, 70 Md. 586, 17 A. 559 (1889). Regard-
ing judges acting in other capacities, see Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 100 S. Ct.
1967 (1980) (judges acting in a "legislative" capacity have an absolute legislative immu-
nity) (judges acting in an administrative capacity have no immunity to prospective relief).
216. Federal judges are immune to suit in federal court as a matter of federal common law. See
Bradley v. Fisher, 78 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
State judges, as a matter of federal common law, are immune to suit based on federal
claims in federal court. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (federal constitutional claims). By
hypothesis, state judges' official immunity to suit based on state claims in federal court is
a matter of state law.
217. By hypothesis, the immunity of federal judges, as a matter of federal common law, is
entitled to supremacy in state courts under U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 and MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 2. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976) (removal to federal courts of suits in
state courts against federal officers); note 180 supra (immunity of federal government in
state courts).
Judicial Relief
Whether judges are immune to suits for injunctive or declaratory
relief is open to question.21
V. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, provisions in the Constitution of Mary-
land for access to judicial relief for violations of individual rights and
for limitations on that access are largely similar to related provisions
in the Constitution of the United States. In some respects, Maryland
law is less protective of constitutional rights than is federal law.
Maryland law provides less certain access to judicial relief for viola-
tions of those rights in that no state statute provides a general
remedy for violation of constitutional rights, and a cause of action
for damages for violation of state constitutional rights has not yet
been implied. Maryland law also places greater limitations on access
to judicial relief in that, generally, the judicial power must be exer-
cised by courts named in the state constitution,"9 less comprehen-
sive waivers of the state's governmental immunity exist, waiver of
state agency immunity requires availability of funds to satisfy a
judgment or the authority to raise such funds by taxation, and state
executive officials are liable only for acts of malice and not for
negligence.
In other respects, Maryland law is more protective of constitu-
tional rights than is federal law. Maryland has fewer limitations on
access to judicial relief for violations of those rights in that state
courts are not limited to categories of cases described in the constitu-
tion, state courts of general jurisdiction are not limited to a jurisdic-
tion described by statute, certain aspects of the state justiciability
doctrine are based on policy, not constitution, with the attendant
procedural and substantive implications, and the state executive
official immunity is limited to "public officials" and does not include
public officers, agents, and employees generally.
A comparative study of constitutional law by Maryland govern-
mental decision-makers-the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary, and the people-will help the state fulfill its function in our
federal system as one of "fifty little laboratories of democracy. "220
State judges are immune to suit based on federal claims in state courts as a matter of
federal common law. Cf. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980) (claim against
state executive official under general federal civil rights remedial statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1979)). State judges are immune to suit based on state claims in state courts as a matter
of state common law. See Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351,356, 196 A.2d 887,889-90 (1964)
(dictum).
218. Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 100 S. Ct. 1967 (1980).
219. Of course, courts created extra-constitutionally may be instruments of oppression rather
than of promotion of constitutional rights. See G. SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAl. AND LEGAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 256-59 (1955) (Court of Star Chamber).
220. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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